Nigel Lawson 'An Appeal to Reason' - A Critical Review

Chapter 1. The science - and the history

• "The science of global warming is far from settled." [p.5]
• Concern about climate change is politically driven, and is today's political correctness.
• [During 1980s and 1990s global temperatures rose steadily, but] from 2000 to 2007 global temperatures have not much risen (page 41). So global warming is not happening.
• He does acknowledge on page 42 that since 2000 solar activity has been low - but he glosses over this fast. [But ...]
• Increases in carbon dioxide CO2 in the atmosphere is not as bad a thing as 'alarmists' make it.
• (He takes a swipe at various dubious environmentalist statements such as calling CO2 'pollution'. None of this improves his arguments, and in fact is rather emotive. We can ignore it.)
• The IPCC has mutated from being a data-collection and analysis organisation into a "politically correct alarmist pressure group" [p.12].
• The climate change models fail to explain everything. [But ...]
• There has been too much 'conjecture' (such as reason for no warming 1940-1975 being due to sulphates emitted from coal burning) and not enough evidence.
• He casts doubt on whether climate science is genuine science. We need 'observations and evidence' rather than models. Also, according to Popper, theories should be falsifiable if they are to be considered scientific, but "It is not immediately apparent what real-world evidence could shake the faith of the true believers" [p.6]. [A poor understanding of science ...]
• Earth's climate has always varied. The 'hockey stick' curve must be false because some of its data comes from one pine tree, and because in an email Dr. Mann refused to send data to someone who was trying to rubbish him. [But ...]
• Climatology is a relatively new science. Our understanding of the climate is in its infancy. Implication seems to be that Lawson can reject current beliefs about climate change with impunity if they happen to be inconvenient to Lawson's views.
• The Stern Report was "essentially a propaganda exercise in support of the UK government's predetermined policy of seeking a world leadership role on climate change." [p.21]. [But ...]

Comments on Chapter 1

Note on Lull in Temperature Rise and Solar Cycles.

Look at this figure, which shows a graph of global temperature over some decades. (Of course the actual graphs would not be as smooth as this; they show the underlying longer-term variation.)

In (a), we see a graph of temperature if there is only solar cycles and no underlying global warming. In (b), we see a graph of temperature if there is underlying global warming plus solar cycles. If there is no global warming, then when solar activity reduces, then global temperature should fall, but with sufficient global warming it merely remains flat (or might even continue increasing). Which has actually happened during the 2000s? Lawson gives the figures [p.7] of global average temperature above 1961-1990 average:

Does this not look more flat than decreasing? Even Lawson admits it is flat. More like graph (b) than graph (a)?

In response to Lord Lawson's figures of 7 years, Sir John Houghton points out that Lawson shows "a surprising ignorance of elementary statistical analysis". Figures from 37 years, from 1970, show "first a clear increasing trend of about 0.5 ēC over the whole period and secondly, a substantial year to year variability of the kind that is well known to climatologists. The latest years are not unusual compared with the rest of the period." Even though these 7 years are flat, "In fact, the seven 21st century years to 2007 are on average warmer by 0.09 ēC than the last seven years of the 20th century ­ even though 1998 holds the overall record."

Moreover, it appears that some of the flattening arises from a changing distribution of temperature measurement devices: there are now fewer drifting buoys, which measured temperature down at the ocean water level, and more up on ships, which measure higher up, slightly colder air. [Source: Metereological Office, 26 November 2010].

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Note about temperatures added 25 January 2020: It has been reported that the 2010s have been the warmest decade on record, and that 2019 has been the second-warmest year, second only to 2016. 2016 temperatures were enhanced by the El-Ninio effect, while 2019 temperatures were not - suggesting that the underlying trend is even greater.

Note about science.

• he has a very restricted view about 'science',
• he has a rather touching faith in 'observations', and
• he ignores the distinction between the scientific generation of models, and the use of the same.

Restricted view about science. Popper is only a tiny part of the story of understanding science. Here is a fuller account of the scientific process, as it is understood today:

"Facts (observations) are not neutral because they arise from classifications and distinctions. These are not neutral, because they arise from theories or hypotheses, as Popper argued. These are not neutral because they arise from paradigms, as Kuhn argued. These are not neutral because they arise from research programmes, as Lakatos argued. Even these are not neutral, because they arise within disciplines. Disciplines are not neutral because they presuppose a systematic philosophy, whether this is explicitly worked out or not. A systematic philosophy is not neutral, because what both 'systematic' and 'philosophy' mean depends on our life-and-world-view (LWV), which is closely related to our common sense or lifeworld - as Husserl and others argued. These in turn are not neutral, argued Dooyeweerd, because they arise from, presuppose and are based on religious ground-motives."

"Not neutral" means that we must take responsibility rather than relying on some mechanical 'truth' - and this non-neutrality occurs all the way down, at every level.

Faith in 'observations'. Theories are models are theories. They are conceptual models that express our current beliefs about how reality works, which we believe it is valid to apply across a range of situations; some of them are expressed in words, some expressed in mathematics, yet others are expressed in computer code. Climate change models happen to be expressed in computer code. While theories and models should always give way to direct data from pre-theoretical experience, this is by no means as simple as Lawson implies. To make an observation means that we must first decide what to observe and what to not observe. This decision is by no means neutral. For example, if you measure temperatures, where do you measure them? And how? Observing is a labour- and resource-intensive process. Lawson gives several examples of limited observation. Moreover the purpose of observation in science is to formulate theories (models about how reality works that we can apply across a range of situations). Then, to say something about these other situations, we need to use our theories (models).

Difference between generating and using theories (models). The activity of science is to generate and refine theories. The use of such theories is not science, but application, and application is driven by some measure of trust in the theories, and involves a variety of range of thinking, including economic and political. In the case of climate change, we have both activities.

• Climate models (theories about how the climate works) have been generated by a scientific process. This includes gathering observations, finding models that fit these, testing them, and then continuously refining them as new observations arrive. This continual refining is part of Popper's falsification process. Contrary to Lawson's claim, the climate change models are refutable. They are continuously being refuted and refined in their detail.
• But to predict future climate the climate models must be used. In using a model or theory, one places trust in it. And one brings other types of reasoning to bear on it, deciding what to do in light of what it predicts.

However, it is possible to be lax in both generation and use of models / theories. Laxness can arise from prejudice. It might be that some of we climate 'alarmists' have been lax. If so, then we deserve to have our knuckles rapped. But I believe the laxness is far less than climate change deniers claim.

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Note about incomplete models.

Sir John Houghton's response explains well about uncertainties in climate data.

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Note about the Rising Temperatures and Hockey Stick curve.

If you wished to find global temperatures over the past 1000 years or even longer period, how would you go about it? Can you find reliable records read from thermometers 1000 years ago? Of course not. So is it not reasonable to use different methods as they are available? Thermometer records should be used for recent years, but can we not find other temperature-sensitive phenomena from earlier years? Are not tree rings one such phenomenon? So why not use tree rings of very old trees? If you can find only one such tree, is it not better to use that than to use nothing?

Lawson assumes the Hockey Stick Curve is more likely to be false than true, but his reasons for doing so are questionable: low sample size and discourtesy by a scientist to someone who emailed him. Low sample size does not make the early data wrong, just less reliable than other data. This lesser reliability has, as far as I understand, been taken into account.

Moreover, whereas global average temperatures might rise by only a degree or two, both the effect and the temperature rise is likely to vary greatly over the globe. Rising temperatures in colder climes does more damage than in tropics, because of greater snow and tundra melt. And it is likely that colder northern climes will rise by ten or more degrees C, and the tropics rising less.

October 2010: The climate science of the University of East Anglia had been attacked a year or two ago. The Russell Report, which investigated the UEA's treatment of data etc. concluded that while some charges stand, concerning process and unwillingness to involve critics, all the charges of dishonesty and malpractice and lack of integrity were found to be baseless. Every single one of the charges against their science (and results) proved groundless.

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Chapter 2: The next Hundred Years: How Warm? How Bad?

• There is uncertainty in the figures about climate change.
• Therefore the 'alarmists' might be wrong in the figures they are using.
• So, on this basis, we can (should) completely ignore and disbelieve most of what those concerned about climate change say.
• Moreover, the problems claimed for climate change (water, food, coasts, species extinctions, and health) either won't happen, or are not linked to CC. [Oh dear ...]
  • Water: Categorical denial of any link with CC. Readily accepts the cause is overpopulation, along with touching optimism about technology and water resource management.
  • Ecosystems (extinction): Claims it won't happen.
  • Food: The answer is genetic modification.
  • Coasts: Don't worry: sea level will hardly rise at all.
  • Health: "Warmer but richer is in fact healthier than colder but poorer." [p.33] And the 20,000 deaths in 2003 can be explained by health workers going on holiday, and it has nothing whatsoever to do with CC.

• But what is the cost of CC damage? Lawson claims [p.36] that in 100 years' time, without global warming, the developed world would be 2.7 times better off and the developing world would be 9.6 times better off, in terms of GDP per head of population, but that with global warming, these figures would reduce only slightly to 2.6 and 8.5 times better off. So CC is not a problem at all. [But ...]
• So we need not worry about possible impacts of climate change.
• Especially as the costs now of preventing it will be so big for us.

Comments on Chapter 2

Note about five impacts of climate change.

In the main, he presents no sound evidence, nor even argument, that CC is actually irrelevant to all of these. All he does is either to show that other factors are also important (and illogically concludes that therefore CC cannot be important) or he claims that it is nothing to worry about, and that technology will fix it.

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Note on Times-Better-Off.

First, where are his calculations, and where is the detailed explanation of them so that we can follow them and check the assumptions he makes? On what basis can we trust them? All he says about how he calculated this is "It can readily be calculated" [p.36]. What he seems to have done is to take estimates for annual increase in GDP/person (2.3% and 1% for developing and developed economies) and apply that figure a hundred times, then reduced this by the estimate for how global warming will harm GDP (10% and 3% respectively, all figures from IPCC's special report on scenarios).

Second, if this is how he made his calculation, it is flawed even by his own standards. He assumes that average GDP/person will increase steadily annually by the same rate of 1% or 2.3%. Is this not rather hypocritical? Has he not already made much of the difficulty in predicting the future temperature? Why should be believe that his financial predictions are any more reliable than the ones he is throwing doubt on? Worse, while the earth's temperature rise is subject to mere physical laws (albeit highly complex), is not the rise in GDP subject to a much more complex set - economic, social, political, psychological, religious, and so on? So why is it that he, almost gleefully, keeps on repeating "'only' 8.5 rather than 9.5 better off" with so much certainty throughout the rest of his book? Are not his applications of it the ease of adaptation and the non-necessity of making sacrifices thereby highly dubious?

Third, is not the calculation meaningless, even if his predictions are correct? If we look at the last 100 yaers, back to, for example, 1910, prosperity was rising, and especially in the developing world. If we had made a similar calculation then, about what it would be like today in developing countries, would we not have predicted almost universal prosperity for all the world? But what do we find today? Huge prosperity in the developed nations, huge poverty in the developing nations rubbing shoulders with obscene wealth. And this is without climate change. What will we find in 100 years with climate change? In the next chapter, Lawson sums his view up by the astounding claim that "the poorer regions are, for the most part, not going to be poor in a hundred years time" [p.40] If we look at the world today compared with 100 years ago, has not the disparity between Europe and Africa widened rather than narrowed, despite two world wars that decimated Europe? Does this not suggest that Lawson's analysis is completely wide of the mark?

Fourth, it is accepted very widely that GDP is not a good measure of what is good in life. Even in the UK has not happiness decreased with increased GDP? In the world as a whole while GDP has grown steadily, is it not the case that disparities have widened, injustice has soared, wars have ravaged, genocides have occurred, terrorism has increased, fear has increasingly affected us, and so on?

Fifth, does this not cast doubt on the whole exercise of economic analysis on which Lawson so heavily relies? I would even criticise the IPCC for the misleading nature of its estimates that climate change will reduce GDP by 10% and 3%. Does 10% really capture all the aspects of evil above? (If Lawson wanted to criticise the IPCC, why did he not criticise this aspect of their work?)

In his response to Lord Lawson's argument Sir John Houghton says "Estimates of the costs of the damage of global warming in the Stern Review allow to some extent for these increases in floods and droughts, although I believe probably not adequately. Partly because until recently few quantitative estimates of increased risk were available and partly because much of the damage, for instance due to droughts, is not easy to express in monetary terms." Is it possible that 10% is too low?

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Chapter 3. The Importance of Adaptation

• The IPCC analysis underestimates the possibility that we can adapt to global warming. The Stern Review is even worse.
• We should take adaptation into account [p.39]. [Agreed in principle, but ...]
• Adaptive capacity will be higher in well-developed countries, but less in poorer ones. This won't matter, because:
  • The poor nations will not be poor in 100 years time (at least 8.5 times better off in terms of GDP per head; see above); implication: they will be able to afford adaptation.
  • Also, the rich nations will all club together with plenty of aid, sufficient to pay the costs of adaptation in the poor countries.
  • "There will almost certainly be substantial technological development" [p.40].

  [But ...]

• We will all adapt because humanity is creative. For example, farmers will just grow different crops. [But ...]
• Governments will need to build flood defences.
• Adaptation is better than mitigation, for several reasons:
  • None of the adverse impacts of CC are new.
  • Adaptation will reduce the impacts.
  • Adaptation can respond to local variations in impacts.
  • There are benefits to global warming as well as costs.
  • Beneficial results of adaptation arise faster than is possible with emissions cutback.
  • Adaptation can work without international agreement, whereas mitigation cannot.

• The Stern Review is 'bureaucratic' in saying that adaptation is difficult because we don't know the nature of the effects.
• Adaptation will cost a lot less than mitigation. And such costs can be put off to the future.
• (Lawson emotively rubbishes those who take an idealist stance that humanity should not 'mess about' with the planet too much.)

Comments on Chapter 3

Note on Taking Adaptation into Account.

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Note on Adaptation Capability.

• Lawson says that poor nations will be at least 8.5 times better off in terms of GDP per person. (See also Note on Times Better Off.) Even if they are, by how much will the cost of adaptation have increased by then? Is it valid to assume it will cost only what it does today? Is it not likely that, relatively speaking, the poorer nations will still find it impossible to adapt?
• Lawson says that rich nations will contribute to adaptation by poor nations. Where is the evidence that the rich nations will be generous enough. What happened in the case of the once-in-1000-years millennium debt cancellation? Even if the rich world does 'help' the poor to adapt, is it not likely to do so in a way that benefits itself?
• Lawson says that technology will develop. Probably. But ... First, is technology always as successful at solving the problems as we expect it to be early on? Has the promise that nuclear power would be "too cheap to measure" been fulfilled? Second, does not technology also generate other unexpected problems, which then absorb a lot of our attention? Third, will not the advanced technology be developed in the rich countries, so that the poor nations will then be even more dependent on the rich than they are today?

So will the poorer nations not still be left to the ravages of climate change? If so, what do we do with hundreds of millions of environmental refugees? Will we let them come into our better-off lands? Or will we just abandon them and let them suffer? Has Lawson adequately thought this through?

But worse. How will the non-human world adapt? It takes a species many generations to adapt in even small ways. Humans and larger animals might be able to move to new places, but plants cannot.

Is it not incredibly stupid to put all our eggs in the adaptation basket?

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Note on Farmers Adapting to Climate Change.

What about subsistence farmers (i.e. those, especially in developing countries, who grow food for themselves rather than for the market)? How are all these people going to be trained, and supplied with new types of crop? And does it not mean that most people will have to get used to different types of food? And will this not disrupt established patterns of nutrition that have developed over centuries? Will this not lead to more disease and so on? Whereas in UK agriculture there is reasonable good communications and farmers are only 2% of the population, in developing countries, growers make up much more of the population and there is no established system of agricultural communication.

Even if only some of these are true, is not Lawson rather cavalier in his assumptions? Who is going to pay for all these changes, training, etc.?

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Note on Stern Review

The Stern Review was written to answer the question, "Suppose climate change were to happen; what would it cost us?" As such, the Stern Review was nearly unique in its time. Most of the argument at the time was whether climate change would happen, whether it was human-made, and what the possible results might be. Most of this did not address the financial side. Stern was the one who tried to do that.

I think the Stern Review can be criticised, not for being too bold but for being too timid. It tried hard to be 'believable' to the politicians who had economic growth as their ultimate aim, rather than taking climate change seriously. The Stern Review thus avoided some of the things it should have tackled. Its economic analysis is very conservative, and its estimate of the costs of climate change as percentage of GDP is not only too small but very misleading.

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Chapter 4. Apocalypse and Armageddon

• Increase in hurricane frequency and intensity. No single hurricane can be attributed to climate change. [But ...]
• Melting of ice sheets. "So far as the Greenland ice sheet is concerned, there is no evidence that ... ice loss is occurring to any significant extent." He admits that the West Antarctica ice sheet is melting, but tries to argue that it has a different climate from the rest of Antarctica, where there is some evidence that ice sheet is thickening. He does admit though that warming will create more snow and thus thicken the ice sheet. [But ...]
• Stopping the Gulf Stream. It won't stop. [I probably agree]
• Tipping points (such as melting of tundra, which then releases more CCEs and speeds up climate change). He largely ignores and pours scorn on the notion of tipping points without discussion or argument. [But ...]
• So we need not do anything much to stop climate change.

Comments on Chapter 4

Note about hurricanes.

In his response Sir John Houghton points to the IPCC's conclusion that "The most critical impacts come from the robust result of the IPCC concerning changes in rainfall patterns, water availability and increases in the number and average severity of floods and droughts. ... floods and droughts cause on average more deaths, more misery and greater economic loss than any other disasters ­ so their increasing trend is bad news especially for those in the most vulnerable parts of the world." Lawson does not do justice to these issues.

Back to Chapter 4

Note on Ice Sheet Melting.

With the Antarctica ice sheet thickening, does not Lawson actually admit that warming is actually one of the reasons for its thickening? If so, does this not suggest that warming is happening?

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Note on Tipping Points.

All Lawson gives us on tipping points is on pp47-48: "The Stern Review is at the extreme end of the alarmist camp, warning us that ... 'at some point ... may take the world past irreversible tipping points'. And there is much more in this vein. ... this sort of scaremongering ...", "Professor Hulme was particularly scathing about Mr Blair's open letter to EU Heads of State, in which he declared that 'We have a window of only 10-15 years to take the steps we need to avoid crossing a catastrophic tipping point'.", "Professor Paul Hardaker ... '... the idea of a point of no return, or a 'tipping point', is a misleading way to think about climate and can be unnecessarily alarmist." That is all. No actual arguments about whether tipping points might occur or not nor reasons for disbelieving them except loaded words like 'scaremongering' and 'alarmist'. Despite the fact that elsewhere he goes into great detail trying to prove that the mechanisms that climate science has etc. have proposed are flawed and even inoperative, he does no such thing about tipping points.

Why does Lawson largely ignore such tipping points? Why has he not argued against them, but just remained quiet except for a sneer? Is it because he cannot find any flaw in their arguments? Might we conclude from this that he has no argument against them? And therefore that they are a real possibility?

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Chapter 5. A Global Agreement?

• China is growing rapidly and increasing its CO2 emissions, as it becomes the "factory of the world" p.56. Both China and India subsidise the cost of energy.
• But we ourselves get our material goods from China. The UK has reduced its emissions at modest cost only by outsourcing them to China. (So it is unfair to criticise China for increasing its emissions.) [I agree ...]
• The cost of reducing our emissions further will be much greater because it will become harder to outsource them. [Probably so]
• The West will not be prepared to pay the cost of China's mitigation measures (e.g. carbon capture). [Inconsistent ...]
• India, China and the United States are against agreements to cut climate change emissions. Europe is isolated.
• So agreement is unlikely. [Wrong approach ...]
• Even if we get agreement, making it work will be impossible. [Inconsistent ...]

Comments on Chapter 5

Note on Outsourcing of Climate Change Emissions.

Back to Chapter 5

Note on Agreement being Unlikely.

• Lawson assumes that nobody can do anything effective until all agree. Is this really so? Is it really necessary to have full international agreement before we do something good? If others do wrong (e.g. tax evasion) does that mean that I must also do wrong? For those of a Christian commitment: Does not our Christian faith encourage - even demand - that I do good even when there is no hope of reward? Matthew 6. Are we not called to give up our own interests for Christ's sake? Are we not urged to do good even though others might not? Does not God bring blessing to the world through the good we do? And does not a Christian background in a nation still retain some impact? Maybe that is why Europe is the one taking the lead on this?

• Is there not such thing as the example effect? When a respected figure sets an example, will not at least some others start to follow suit? After some follow, will not more do so? Will not even the laggards follow eventually? Do the USA, China and India really want to be the only ones holding back? Do not people know deep inside what is right to do? And do not most of us have the resources to do it? In view of this, is it valid to refuse to act until there is a guarantee that others will follow? To set an example, one must be willing to be vulnerable, to have advantage taken of one. Is it not woven into the fabric of creation that once this occurs then others follow suit? Is it not the case that the UK unilaterally banned the slave trade - at a time when we were at war with France, who could have taken advantage of it - and that gradually almost all other nations followed suit?

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Note on the Possibility that Agreement will Work.

In both this and the previous note, does Lawson assumes that the entirety of humanity is driven solely and only by self-interest, in which nobody will do an ounce more than they are forced to by others? Though I do agree that self-interest is rife, does self-interest rule for the entirety of humanity all the time. Is it not true that some people some of the time will act altruistically, with courageous generosity? Do not religions encourage this? At least, has not the Gospel of Christ given human beings the motivation and freedom to act in this way, out of thankfulness to God if nothing else. But Lawson ignores this; he assumes that the Gospel of Christ has done nothing in the world - is he not factually wrong about that?

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Chapter 6. The Cost of Mitigation

• Hadley Centre calls for severe cuts in CCEs. They "would require drastic changes in the way we produce and consume energy right across the board - from electricity generation to transport, both surface and air - and in the amount we consume" [p.65]. [I agree]
• "Feelgood measures in the western world, from driving a hybrid car to the abolition of plastic bags, to not leaving our television on standby, are trivial to the point of irrelevance." [p.65-6] [But ...]
• How much would serious mitigation cost? "The only honest answer is that we do not know, but all the signs are that it would prove very costly indeed." [p.66] [But ...]
• There are three ways in which the world economy might become decarbonised. The first and second are to reduce energy intensity and increase cost of fuel. "It seems likely that the rise in the price of petrol needed to persuade us to use less, and the rise in the cost of air fares (from a higher aviation fuel price) needed to persuade us to fly less, would have to be very large indeed, and the political cost of this would almost certainly be prohibitive." [p.67] [But ...]
• Third is to switch to non-carbon electricity (nuclear or renewables or biofuels). (Biofuels have downsides, e.g. giving little more energy out than is put into growing them, and requiring huge land area.) [ok.]
• He takes a swipe at wind power, and sees nuclear power as an answer, but recognises, with regret, that nuclear cannot be the answer in practice only because planning inquiries would take too long. [My disagreement with him here is not germane to climate change so I make no comment.]
• A fourth decarbonisation measure is carbon capture and storage (CCS). If by 2030 still 80% of electricity is still generated by carbon means, then CCS will be important. But the technology is still unproven. [I agree]
• Carbon trading ('cap and trade') also does not work. The European scheme "has done nothing to reduce emissions" [p.75]. Carbon offsetting (e.g. tree-planting) is a scam. [I largely agree, except that if our attitudes changed then they might work; but they won't work until our attitudes change.]
• The only solution is a direct carbon tax. But governments shy away from this because they are scared it would prove unpopular.
• IPCC estimated the cost of mitigation around 1-5% or 0-4% of global GDP [p.79]. [But ...]
• This would, he claims, be borne most "in the first instance" by the people of the developed world, as though he sees that to be a problem [which I do not: It seems to me that even 5% cost is not a great imposition].
• He asks, "how great a sacrifice is it either reasonable or realistic to ask the present generation, particularly the present generation in the developing world, to make, in the hope of avoiding the prospect that the people of the developing world, in a hundred years time, may not be 9.5 times as well off as they are today, but 'only' 8.5 times as well off? Intuitively, the answer is clear: not a lot." [p.81] [But ...]

Comments on Chapter 6

Note about 'Feelgood' Measures.

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Note about Overall Costs.

Did not Lawson accept (earlier) that the the IPCC-estimated costs of climate change as being 3% and 10% of GDP of developed and developing economies respectively? Does this not mean that the cost of mitigation is greater than the cost of climate change problems? Does it not seem reasonable to pay the costs now? Does it not seem reasonable that we, the rich, should pay the costs? Especially since it is our own lifestyles that are the cause?

Sir John Houghton's response presents more argument.

Back to Chapter 6

Note about Fuel Costs.

• In the mid 1990s the Conservative government had imposed a fuel duty escalator, by which the cost of fuel would increase more than the rate of inflation every year. Such an increase would be gradual, but it had begun to have an effect. In contradiction to what Lawson claims. American company Wisconsin Central invested in the British rail freight industry. When the Blair-Brown Labour government abandoned the fuel duty escalator, Wisconsin Central pulled out, saying that the action destroyed their predictions of rises in rail freight. Lawson is wrong to say that a huge price hike is always needed.
• He overlooks that people might be persuaded to act on grounds that it is the 'right' thing to do; indeed, we believe that a radical change in attitude is the only solution, and that tinkering with market 'solutions' will be largely irrelevant. But, given a change in attitude, then fiscal measure have a much larger effect because they are then seen as signals that agree with what people already believe.

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Note on Sacrifice by Present Generation.

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Chapter 7. Discounting the Future: Ethics, Risk and Uncertainty

"There is a standard way of measuring future benefits against present costs, that is, to apply a rate of discount to the future.
For jam tomorrow is not worth as much as jam today,
nor is the possibility or even the probability of jam tomorrow worth as much as the certainty of jam tomorrow.
Moreover a pot of jam is worth more to the poor man than to the rich man.
So, for long-term projects, the richer future generations are expected to be, the higher the appropriate discount rate."

• Economists discount future benefits and costs.
• Mitigation costs should be reduced by a discount before comparing them with present costs.
• (Recognise that climate change problems are longer term than most economics deals with, but "the same principles apply." [But ...]
• "The lower the discount rate the more the future looms large."
• Stern Review adopts a discount rate of 2%.
• But this has been criticised by academic economists as too low. UK Treasury in Lawson's time required 3.5% discount rate [mind you, that was in the days of high bank interest rates]. Also, a higher rate is assumed for riskier projects in developing countries.
• However, it is difficult to decide the appropriate discount rate. [So ...]

• He denigrates the Stern Review for admitting the issue is, at the end of the day, about ethics.
• "The Stern Review's treatment of this, however, is profoundly unconvincing. What it does, in effect, is to insist that the only possible ethical position is to consider the welfare of all future generations, stretching ever further out into the mists of time, as being just as important as the welfare of the present generation. It is this assumption which largely (though not entirely) generates its very low discount rate." [p.85]
• This is not the only ethical view, however; David Hume said it is valid to favour those nearest to us over those further away because it is "natural" - "Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions." [D. Hume A Treatise on Human Nature, Bk 3, Pt 2, §1] Lawson also quotes an unpublished article by Ian Little. [But ...].
• So it is ok to discount the needs of future generations with high discount rates.
• And, Lawson suggests, it is "palpably absurd" to treat the welfare of future people as as important as our own welfare. [But ...]
• In fact, it would be immoral to do so because it would be a cost to nearer generations.
• Since global warming catastrophe is, he earlier claimed, unlikely, we need not pay costs now to prevent it.
• We must decide how risk-averse we are.
• Risk-taking is good. Implication seems to be that we can and should risk the catastrophe of climate change.
• But the "greatest flaw" in the CC-concern approach is that global warming is only one of many possible future catastrophes. For example: nuclear holocaust, flu pandemic, asteroid collision, onset of new ice age. Implication seems to be that since CC is one among several catastrophes, we need not do anything about it. [But ...]

Comments on Chapter 7

Note about principles to use.

Back to Chapter 7

Note about calculating discount rates.

What justification has Lawson for increasing the discount rate? It is difficult to calculate the appropriate discount rate on the basis of economics alone, and if we do, we are forced to make assumptions that are arbitrary and, even worse, hidden. These assumptions relate to other aspects of human life and activity, especially aspects of justice and ethics. Lawson does discuss taking ethics into account, but argues for a particular type of ethics that happens to let him decide on a high discount rate and criticise Stern for using a low one: that of Hume. Is Hume the only, and final, word on ethics? But his treatment of these is deeply flawed, especially from a Biblical point of view. See other notes about these below. Are not ethics and justice more important in setting discount rates than mere economics?

Sir John Houghton suggests, "Further, we are faced not just with a judgement of how much in principle we should spend now to avoid damage in the future, but addressing how the energy industries of the world can overcome their system's inertia and turn around in time to meet the targets that the international community is likely to set."

Back to Chapter 7

Note about ethics

Back to Chapter 7

Note about treating other people

Back to Chapter 7

Note about future possible catastrophes.

• That CC might be only one catastrophe among several, it seems to me, tells us very little about whether we should do something to prevent it.
• If we do nothing about CC, will that not set a precedent? When another threatens, will not people then say "Well, we were courageous enough to ignore climate change, so let us ignore this one too."
• Note the difference between the possible future catastrophes he cites. Some are beyond our control, and we can do little about it. Nuclear holocaust is in the control of the one who pushes the button. But climate change is in the control of all of us. It is different. We can do something about this one. Lawson's comparisons are flawed.

Back to Chapter 7

Chapter 8. Summary and Conclusion: A Convenient Religion

• He summarises what he has said. Especially
• "perhaps the most surprising fact about global warming ... is that - despite carbon dioxide emissions rising faster than even - it is not, at the present time, happening." [p.91] [Disingenuous ...]
• "'Save the planet' must surely be a strong contender for the most ludicrous slogan ever coined." [p.93]
• Then he starts to suggest what we might do, given that global warming is (an unlikely) possibility. Specifically, he advocates investment by rich nations in various technologies, especially geo-engineering.
• He also advocates a carbon tax along with which, dollar for dollar, other taxes are reduced. So that "if people like to feel that they are helping to save the planet by paying a carbon tax, they should not be deprived of the opportunity to do so." [p.100].
• Such choices are personal and optional, and they are made (in his opinion) not on facts but on the basis of mere belief.
• Concern for climate change is a new religion. He treats religion as primarily for giving us comfort. [But ...]
• He cites the Archbishop of Canterbury's warning to politicians of their responsibility before God if they fail to curb global warming, and especially if they ignore warnings, and especially in the light of the "profoundly immoral" lifestyle of (most of?) those who contribute to global warming. Lawson then puts the reasonable question of whether God's warnings might be those derived from computer models. But in doing so uses a literary device of false modesty to pour scorn on the Archbishop's views. [Some theology ...]
• The "new religion of eco-fundamentalism and global warming" [p.104] is like Marxism but worse, in that while Marxism was optimistic, the green approach is pessimistic.
• He sees today's politicians [presumably he has Tony Blair in mind? Or Al Gore? It matters not who] clothing themselves in its "priestly garb" and "proclaiming themselves saviours of the planet", as a way to receive deference in an era in which deference is declining. They find it a 'convenient' religion. [But ...]

Comments on Chapter 8

Note on Disingenuous Claim.

• By "present time" he means the seven years 2001-2007. See page 41.
• He ignores the twenty years 1980-1999, during which global warming certainly did happen.
• While he does mention the cycles in solar activity on page 42, he plays this down, because it predicts that after a lull temperatures will rise again.

Given that the very physics predicts that global warming will start slowly and get faster, is surprising to see it currently swamped by the solar cycle? Is Lawson not rather disingenuous here?

Back to Chapter 8

Note on Nature of Religion.

This makes sense why he is partly correct in likening eco-fundamentalism to Marxism: both are strong beliefs that involve commitment and vision.

Back to Chapter 8.

Note on Politicians.

The only question I would raise is not whether they are hypocritical in using air travel to achieve their ecological ends (as Lawson insinuates) but something much deeper that Lawson himself has missed: their ground-motive. A ground-motive is a deep presupposition about the nature of reality, including normative reality, which acts as a spiritual driving force long-term on a culture's thinking (for more see page on ground-motives). The ground-motive of the mediaeval Roman Catholic church was Nature-Grace, while the modern Humanistic ground-motive is centred on the dichotomy between nature and freedom. I see Tony Blair as driven by the former and both Lawson and Al Gore driven by the latter. In a dualistic ground-motive like this, those who cling to one pole see those at the other as enemies. Lawson is near the freedom pole, Gore seems nearer the nature pole. But the one I espouse is the Biblical one of Creation-Fall-Redemption. Under this ground-motive, the whole creation is good, but it is human beings who bring evil because of the orientation of our hearts (attitude, below).

Back to Chapter 8

Note on Theology of Warnings.

Jesus castigated the leaders of the time for not heeding the warnings of the time. These were likened to warnings about tomorrow's weather. The central issue was not the medium by which the warning was delivered but the attitude they displayed, a refusal to believe rather than an open-minded caution. In the Old Testament, we find the prophet Ezekiel being told by God that his duty as a 'watchman' was to be sure he gave the warning, and then the people who refused to heed it would be guilty on their own account. So God does expect us to take warnings, and holds us to account if we do not, especially if the reason we do not is a refusal to do so. I sense this refusal in most climate-change-skeptics, including Lawson. They will be judged by God, not just on their disbelief, but on their refusal to believe.

Moreover, the Biblical view has a certain logic to it: We human beings have been given responsibility for the rest of creation, as 'shepherds' of it. In Ezekiel chapter 34 the shepherds are castigated:

"Woe to the shepherds of Israel who only take care of themselves. Should not the shepherds take care of the flock? You eat the curds, clothe yourselves with the wool, and slaughter the choice animals but you do not take care of the flock. You have not strengthened the weak or healed the sick or bound up the injured. You have not brought back the strays or searched for the lost. You have ruled them harshly and brutally. ... Therefore you shepherds hear the word of the LORD: As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign LORD, because my flock lacks a shepherd and so has been plundered and has become food for all the wild animals, and because my shepherds did not search for my flock but cared for themselves rather than for my flock, therefore, O shepherds, hear the word of the LORD. This is what the Sovereign LORD says: I am against the shepherds and will hold them accountable for my flock. ..."

Of course, this applies directly to the Jewish leaders, and also to Jesus Christ coming as the 'good shepherd'. But notice the principle by which God judges: callous attitude, self-seeking, disregard for those we are in charge of. This is what God hates. Is it too much to apply this to humanity's responsibility for God's world?

Back to Chapter 8

III. OVERALL COMMENTS: MAJOR PROBLEMS IN LAWSON'S BOOK

Here are some problems in Lawson's book that are deeper and broader than the problems above. Most of them pertain to several chapters in the book, or even to the whole.

Contents of Overall Comments:

• He does not adequately argue why action now would be harmful.
• He often misses the point.
• He adopts a narrow outlook. - Can only see money and GDP, not responsibility or justice.
• He does not understand uncertainty in data.
• He seems bent on trying to rubbish those who ought to be praised for trying to do a difficult job.
• His style of argument is flawed - often emotive, with innuendo, insinuation and inconsistency.

Inadequate Argument Against Action Now

The only argument he gives for not taking action now is that it might involve us, developed nations, changing our lifestyles, 'sacrificing' up to 5% of GDP [p.79]. Lawson seems to think both change in lifestyle and a 5% cost must be completely ruled out. But:

• Is 5% of GDP really so very big as to rule out such a cost? Is this not around the ballpark of the recent downturn in global economy, and do we not seem to be coping?
• Is a change of lifestyle in the rich nations really such a bad thing? For example, do not Americans eat far too much even for their own health, let alone the health of the planet? Could not the USA reduce its lifestyle by, say, 10% without major harm?
• Might there not be actual benefits in a simpler lifestyle that generates fewer carbon emissions? For example, is it not the case that increase in income fails to increase happiness?

Lawson Often Misses the Point

Lawson's Narrow View

• He completely ignores responsibility. And he completely ignores the precautionary principle. He seems to go against the precautionary principle to its opposite: unless we have certainty that the alarmists are right, then we should work against them. He ignores the way humanity leaves the planet, with increased CO2 and other pollutants. It may be that for a time temperature rise can be restricted, by various means, but the underlying increase in CO2 is a timebomb (if indeed CO2 does change climate, as he seems to accept). He ignores that timebomb. Instead, he recognises only money and GDP, as the following show ...

• He seems to assume that policy should not be made until Treasury has fully costed it out. He ignores the fact that governments sometimes (all too rarely, in my view) act to do what's right, and let the economics follow - or perhaps he believes that governments should never do what's right, but only what is financially rewarding.

• p22: "It is worth noting that, in the field of economic policy, it is nowadays generally accepted by central bankers that endemic uncertainty needs to be recognized as the central fact of life ..."

  In view of the economic downturn, credit crunch and stockmarket collapse that occurred during 2008, the year his book came out, is it not rather amusing that he holds up the banking system as an example to follow? Specifically, he argues, they saw uncertainty as a market opportunity. Also, he says "Another form of reality check is to look at the stock market. ..." [p.106] ! Does not that show how wrong Lawson is in the emphasis he gives to finance and financial measures?

• p35-36. He makes calculations about GDP standard of living and the impact that CC might have. He points out that with CC will be 'only' 8.5 times better off compared with 9.6 times better off without CC. etc.

  I do not have the figures to hand, so cannot comment on his calculations, but I am suspicious of them. But even if his calculations are correct, is he justified in taking GDP-measured standard of living as the only important factor? For example, the Children's Society recently (2009) published a report that children are suffering today because of selfishness of parents (who are well off). What about environmental refugees?

• p36: "Such are the ravages of global warming. ... This is the disaster from which we are told we have to save the planet." He has tried to show that in fact we will be better off than now with CC.

  He seems to think he has delivered a coup de gras. But he has ignored many issues, such as storms, he has made GDP the overriding factor. He has not convincingly shown that the warnings of the 'alarmists' will not happen, but only shown that some of them might not happen, and wants us to thereby conclude that none of them will. See elsewhere.

• p82: "We invest money now, whether in physical or human capital, only because we expect to earn a return over time." - but that's precisely where he is wrong: We do not do things now only because of expecting a return, but also (in addition) because we enjoy it, because it is right, because we want to benefit the others rather than ourselves, and/or because of our beliefs. Lawson sees nothing but finance; he tries, with unobtrusive words like 'only', to obliterate all other aspects of human living from the argument. If we remove the 'only', then what he says is true as long as we think solely in economic terms. But as soon as we recognise the other aspects of our lives, then we must bring in things like justice, self-giving, faith, fun, and much more. That is one of Lawson's primary errors: reduced, narrow thinking - we might understand a former Chancellor of Exchequer having a tendency to give more importance to the economic aspect than average, but from an elder politician we would expect rather more wisdom than to treat this as the 'only' thing that is important. Though he does claim to recognise that ethics is important [p.85], it seems only in order to rubbish the Stern Review's approach to it.

Lawson Rubbishes the Reputable

• He rubbishes Sir John Houghton. But I know Sir John, to be a very careful and caring scientist, and a deeply committed follower of the Lord Jesus Christ. Even Lawson gives evidence of Sir John's quality, in that he admits the uncertainty. p24: "Sir John Houghton ... has conceded: 'when you put models together which are climate models added to impact models added to economic models, they you have to be very wary indeed of the answers you are getting, and how realistic they are.' The IPCC itself has described it as a 'cascade of uncertainty'." See below about Sir John Houghton, who has written two replies to this book.

• p21: He rubbishes the Stern Review on grounds that he, as Chancellor, would have asked Treasury to conduct a thorough assessment of economics of climate change. {Incidentally, why didn't he do so? Climate change was known about during his time.} By saying that Stern Review "was only embarked upon after the event, and is essentially a propaganda exercise in support of the UK government's predetermined policy of seeking a world leadership role on climate change. As a result, while its 692 pages contain much of interest, neither its conclusions nor the arguments on which they are based possess much merit."

  {While I am critical of the Blair government wanting a position of 'leader' in this, I think that Lawson is very wrong here. 1. Stern Review was in fact a Review, given the policy. Surely this is a valid thing for governments to do? 2. Surely Governments have a right to set policy? 3. Money is not the only important thing in life; policy *can* sometimes be made on other bases, e.g. justice or ethics. Governments *are* allowed to do that. 4. It is wise to estimate costs. But if the uncertainty is as bad as he says, how long would it take Treasury to come up with a costing that is believable enough for him. From what he has said, it seems he would only accept a cost that has zero uncertainty. Or is it that he would accept a cost that suited his own predetermined political views and beliefs? 5. Sometimes, it is good to pay the costs of doing right. e.g. abolition of slavery, e.g. Marshall Plan. Spending on such costs can even stimulate economies, and have an unanticipated . 6. Is it because he is a Tory and wants to decry Labour? I believe it's deeper: he is what might be called an anti-climate alarmist - a person who tries to spread alarm about the costs of tackling climate change. As mentioned at the start, this is a religious issue: Lawson is religiously committed against climate concern.}

• The IPCC was set up not to do new research, but to collect together existing research and, to sift and check it, and to present scenarios. This is exactly what it does. Because its job is to present scenarios, it is not appropriate to criticise it in some of the ways Lawson does. In his response to Lord Lawson Sir John Houghton reminds us of the IPCC's very careful wording: "most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid 20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations". As Houghton says, "Lawson throws doubt on this conclusion, not with any analysis of his own, but just by listing some of the sources of uncertainty that are in any case thoroughly addressed by the IPCC. Indeed one of the greatest strengths of the IPCC is its proper assessment of the uncertainties." Though the IPCC made very careful study of aerosol effects, Lawson's dismisses it as "pure speculation" without any evidence or analysis of his own. Houghton concludes "I can only conclude that he has not actually read the IPCC reports." (Is it any wonder that Lawson tries to rubbish Sir John Houghton?)

Lawson's Style of Argument

Emotive words.

• Those who are concerned about climate change are "alarmists" "climate alarmists" (even to describe IPCC)
• Whereas those who are sceptical are described as "excellent and informative" [p.8-9].

Insinuation and Innuendo

• He Attacks the IPCC p11-12 "Unfortunately, in a number of important respects, the IPCC's processes have become seriously flawed." The IPCC, he says, set up "to be a fact-finding and analytical exercise, has mutated in the minds of most of those who head it into something more like a politically correct alarmist pressure group." Note: he cites headlines from Financial Times rather than the IPCC report. The fault lies in the press, not in the IPCC, but he accuses IPCC of guilt by association.

• p26: The IPCC claims it does not predict but proffers 'what if' scenarios - Lawson dismisses this as done "airily". Then "Well, well. In fact, it is hard to escape the suspicion that the IPCC declined to update its emissions scenarios for fear that the new ones might give rise to lower temperature projections."

  It may well be that the IPCC proffers 'what if' scenarios. If so, then the the original scenarios are still possibilities as 'what if's. But he likes to rubbish IPCC, not with reason, but with innuendo and snide insinuation. That is why he uses the word 'airily' - to plant in our minds that the IPCC is being cowardly and deceitful.

Intemperate language.

Inconsistent.

• p15: Tropical troposphere warming less than at surface. But "Climate models predict that we should have seen a relatively greater warning in the troposphere than at the surface" But earlier he disdains computer models. But now that they suit his cause, he welcomes their operation.

It is indeed ironic that Nigel Lawson claims 'An Appeal to Reason'.

Sir John Houghton

Sir John Houghton has published two responses to Nigel Lawson.

• Shorter version published in Nature (web page)
• Full version (pdf)

NOTES

Note about terminology

"Don't call it 'global warming', but 'climate change'. The greenhouse effect will increase energy in the atmosphere. Increased kinetic energy in the atmosphere means more storms and changed wind patterns. So Britain [I live in Britain] will get more winds from Siberia [the cold north], and might get cooler not warmer, even though the rest of the world gets warmer."

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

• Thanks to Martin Ansdell-Smith for checking the manuscript.
• Thanks to Michael Knowles for comments on electricity costs.
• Thanks to Prof. John Dearden for loan of his copy of Lawson's book.
• Thanks to the John Ray Initiative for drawing attention to Sir John Houghton's response to Lord Lawson's book.

Last updated: 6 June 2010 chapters 5, 6, 7 summaries with notes and 'but's. 13 June 2010 major rearrangement, and revamp. Tidying up. 23 June 2010 gw v cc, no-against. 28 June 2010 ch8, and redid intro summary. 11 July 2010 redid introductory overview, and added graph. 13 July 2010 ack, new intro. 18 July 2010 minor errors MAS corrected; added links back to chapters; reword intro. 19 July 2010 knowles cmt, edited some of my more careless text. 2 September 2010 changed some intro and text. 3 September 2010 removed comment on wind v nuclear. 6 September 2010 shorter intro that makes clear not trying to prove cc. 17 September 2010 rlg dets how we analyse data. 30 September 2010 links to Sir JH's comments. 26 November 2010 fewer buoys, reversed title. 28 November 2010 shortened overall. 22 March 2011 shorter intro; rearranged material. 15 May 2011 Russell Report on hockey stick. 20 August 2011 but-Stern. 19 February 2014 list of flaws in Intro, a couple of other minor changes. 16 July 2014 stop press re GWPF. 25 January 2020 Margaret Thatcher and Lawson's responsibility; 2010s warmest decade.